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Abstract
In this paper, I analyse the reciprocal social inﬂuence on investment decisions within an
international group of roughly 2000 mutual fund managers that invested in companies
of the DAX30. Using a robust estimation procedure, I provide empirical evidence that
in the average a fund manager puts 0.69% more portfolio weight on a particular stock,
if other fund managers increase the corresponding position by 1%. The dynamics of this
inﬂuence on portfolio weights suggest that fund managers adjust their behaviour according
to the prevailing market situation and are more strongly inﬂuenced by others in times of
an economic downturn. Analysing the working locations of the fund managers, I conclude
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exchange of opinion is more or less constant.
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As of September 30th 2011, mutual funds worldwide had $ 9,043 billion
equity assets under management.1 This corresponds to one third of the global
investable equity opportunity set.2 Hence, mutual fund managers’ overall in-
vestment behaviour might have a considerable impact on the dynamics of
stock prices, if they simultaneously make similar investment decisions, such
that prices are driven into a speciﬁc direction. In this context, it is important
to distinguish how parallel decisions arise. The group of fund managers is
homogenous, such that it is likely that they independently make the same
decisions. However, fund managers might also inﬂuence each other such that
investment decisions are aligned.
There is large body in the ﬁnancial literature that provides empirical evi-
dence in favour of the latter explanation, i.e. social inﬂuence3 among mutual
fund managers. There are two strands separating how social inﬂuence takes
place. Inﬂuence through observation is generally stated by the large body
of the literature that deals with herding behaviour. In this context it is
generally assumed that a fund manager is homogenously inﬂuenced by all
other fund managers. A pioneer work of this herding literature has been
presented by Lakonishok et al. (1992). With their empirical measure, which
has been applied in many studies since then,4 they provided weak empirical
evidence for herding behaviour among US pension fund managers. For the
German market, Oehler and Wendt (2009) ﬁnd that fund managers show
herding behaviour when they face market-wide cash inﬂows or cash outﬂows.
Walter and Weber (2006) also detect herding behaviour among German fund
managers. However, they show that a large portion of this behaviour is unin-
tentional due to changes in benchmark index compositions. Hence, identiﬁed
herding patterns are rather spurious caused by correlated signals. Regarding
1See statistics of the Investment Company Institute on www.ici.org/research/stats/
worldwide/ww 09 11.
2As of November 30th 2011, MSCI reports a market capitalisation of $ 30,057 billion
for the MSCI ACWI All Cap Index that covers approximately 98% of the global equity
investment opportunity set. Index fact sheets are available on www.msci.com/resources/.
3Social inﬂuence refers to the situation where fund managers directly inﬂuence each
other. This is opposed to indirect inﬂuence that for instance takes place via market price
mechanisms.
4See Frey et al. (2006) for a brief survey of studies that used the measure of Lakonishok
et al. (1992).
2the impact on stock prices, they conclude that herding behaviour has neither
a stabilising nor a destabilising eﬀect. Pomorski (2009) deviates from the
classical herding literature that assumes a homogeneous reciprocal inﬂuence
of all participants in the market. He analyses how mutual fund managers
with outstanding past performance inﬂuence other fund manager. It is pro-
vided evidence that inﬂuence on fund managers that performed poorly in the
past is greater than on fund managers with moderate past performance.
The other strand of empirical literature that deals with the inﬂuence by the
exchange of opinion, also known as word-of-mouth eﬀect5, among mutual
funds managers is much sparser. First evidence has been provided by the
survey data of Shiller and Pound (1989) indicating that the word-of-mouth
eﬀect among institutional investors plays a considerable role. The empirical
survey of Arnswald (2001) also reveals the existence of the exchange of opin-
ion among German mutual fund managers. A milestone is represented by
the work of Hong et al. (2005) who provide empirical evidence that portfolios
of fund manager in the same city are more similar than of those working in
other cities. This still holds true after controlling for the city speciﬁc eﬀect of
local preferences, which means that fund manager in the same city all tend
to put more weight on the same local companies. It is concluded that fund
managers exchange their opinion within a city based network and adjust their
investment decisions accordingly. Pareek (2011) relaxes the assumption of
city based homogeneous networks by assuming that fund managers holding
a large portion of a speciﬁc stock maintain an informational network link ir-
respective their working location. This assumption is justiﬁed by correlated
trading behaviour that cannot be explained by style investing or geographic
locations. The density of the underlying network is then related to stock
price dynamics and it is provided empirical evidence that prices of stocks are
less volatile if that are held by fund managers that maintain more network
links to other fund managers.
With this paper, I contribute to both strands of literature by determining
the whole magnitude of social inﬂuence among fund managers and dividing
it into observational inﬂuence and inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion
afterwards. Irrespective how the inﬂuence takes place, I allow it to be het-
erogeneous among fund managers. This means I do not assume that a single
5I use the term ”exchange of opinion” in order to emphasise, that information is not
only transmitted, but also discussed.
3fund manager is equally inﬂuenced by all other fund managers. As a major
contribution, I relate both, the absolute magnitude of inﬂuence as well as
the number of fund managers by whom a single fund manager is inﬂuenced
to the prevailing market environment.
My ﬁrst hypothesis is that social inﬂuence among fund managers represents
a substantial eﬀect. The theoretical literature about the behaviour of mutual
fund managers oﬀers a wide range of explanations in favour of this hypoth-
esis.6 In his famous book ”Irrational exuberance”, Shiller states that fund
managers’ action are driven by human greed and fear (see Shiller (2000)).
However, there exist several rational foundations. From the perspective of a
single fund manager, other fund managers might have or at least be assumed
to have a better set of information, which is revealed by the observation of
their investment decisions (Welch, 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993, 1995;
Avery and Zemsky, 1998; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Bikhchandani et al., 1998).
Equivalently, other fund managers might be perceived to have a better abil-
ity to process available pieces of information, such that observing and copy-
ing their decisions is beneﬁcial (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992).
Moreover, imitating fund managers with a high reputation has less severe
consequences in the case of a failure (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Dasgupta
and Prat, 2008). Furthermore, fund managers are remunerated according
to their relative performance within a certain period of time which usually
equals one year. If they already outperformed other fund managers in the
ﬁrst part of this period, they have an incentive to copy investment behaviour
of other fund managers such that relative performance is ﬁxed on the prevail-
ing level (Maug and Naik, 1996). Eren and Ozsoylev (2006); Stein (2008);
Gray (2010) among others give a rationale for the exchange of opinion among
participants in ﬁnancial markets. Although they are competitors, fund man-
agers can proﬁt by sharing their methods of information elaboration that are
then reciprocally enriched by the opinion and views of the counterpart.
With my second hypothesis, I put the magnitude of fund managers’ social
inﬂuence as well as the number of fund managers by whom a single fund
manager is inﬂuenced into a perspective. I state that they vary both over
time according to the prevailing market environment and are lower (higher)
6See e.g. Bikhchandani and Sharma (2000); Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) for a survey of
theoretical and empirical research on herd behaviour on ﬁnancial markets or ? for a more
recent survey about general social inﬂuence on ﬁnancial markets.
4during an economic upturn (downturn). The theoretical foundation for this
hypothesis is as follows. In a bull market fund managers rather try to distin-
guish themselves from their competitors in order to ”stand out of the crowd”
and to get a higher remuneration (Zwiebel, 1995). In times of a bear mar-
ket, fund managers fear the loss of reputation (Scharfstein and Stein, 1990)
and compensation (Maug and Naik, 1996), such that they are more strongly
inﬂuenced by other fund managers.
Looking at the diﬀerent kinds of inﬂuence, my third hypothesis is that only
the magnitude of observational inﬂuence varies as a function of the prevail-
ing market situation, while the inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion stays
constant. This can be justiﬁed by the fact that the number of social contacts
does not alter with the state of the market. However, afore cited aspects of
reputation and remuneration induce fund managers to align their decisions
with a greater (smaller) number of other not personally known competitors
during an economic downturn (upturn).
My dataset consists of portfolio holdings of roughly 2000 equity mutual funds
that had invested at least $ 10 million in companies of the DAX30 index as of
December 31st 2010. For these funds, I retrieved all available portfolio hold-
ings in the period from 2002 to 2010. This time period oﬀers the possibility
to analyse diﬀerent market environments, namely the economic upturn until
from 2002 to 2006 as well as the ﬁnancial and economic crisis starting in
2007. Unlike almost all empirical studies in this domain before, my dataset
contains international investors such that the analysis of inﬂuence is not lim-
ited to country borders. This is an important aspect, because today’s media
make global inﬂuence possible. A further advantage of considering funds that
invest into companies of the DAX30 is that I obtained a quite homogenous
group of fund managers whose behaviour can be related to price dynamics
of the main stock index of Germany which is one of the most important
economies in the world.
For the empirical strategy, I borrow from the literature of social interaction
(see e.g. Manski (1993); Brock and Durlauf (2001); Moﬃtt (2001); Bramoull´ e
et al. (2009); Blume et al. (2010); Lee et al. (2010)). The dependent vari-
able is given by the portfolio weight a fund manager assigns to a particular
stock at a particular point of time. The choice is motivated by the fact that
the portfolio composition represents the entirety of a fund manager’s current
believes. Unlike quite all empirical studies before, trades of fund managers
are not considered. The reason is given by the fact, that they would have to
be inferred by portfolio changes. However, portfolio holdings in the dataset
5are only available on a quarterly or semi-annually basis and Elton et al.
(2010) showed that this introduces a great sample bias, because round trip
trades cannot be captured and the point of time, when the trade actually
took place also remains uncertain. A further and even more important argu-
ment in favour of portfolio weights is their relative nature. They always sum
up to 100% and thus are not aﬀected by the prevailing market environment
that could for instance lead to market wide cash in or outﬂows of equity
assets. This is a crucial aspect for the veriﬁcation of my second hypothe-
sis. I determine the underlying network of inﬂuence among fund managers
endogenously. Therefore, every possible link between two fund managers is
examined. One drawback of the herding measure proposed by Lakonishok
et al. (1992) is that one cannot directly distinguish between true and spurious
inﬂuence. I intend to overcome this by controlling for several factors that are
decisive for portfolio selection. These control variables comprise the average
historic return, the volatility, as well as the analysts’ consensus price target,
earnings forecast and price earnings ratio of every particular stock a fund
manager holds in his portfolio. I furthermore account for the index weight
of a single stock, if it is included in one of the major global indexes. Finally,
I also control for the working location of a fund manager and the headquar-
ters of the company that has emitted the particular stock. The database of
portfolio holdings has been enriched by all these control variables and results
to be unique for the quantity of portfolio weights amounting to 6 million,
which have been matched with stock speciﬁc data of about 17,000 compa-
nies. After having determined the underlying inﬂuential network, the overall
average magnitude of inﬂuence can be estimated. Thereafter, I separate the
observational inﬂuence and the inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion by the
working locations of the fund managers. Using the empirical evidence pro-
vided by Hong et al. (2005), an intra-city link between two fund managers is
deﬁned as inﬂuence trough the exchange of opinion while all inter-city links
are considered to be observational inﬂuence.
In the average, a fund manager puts 0.69% more portfolio weight on a partic-
ular stock, if other fund managers increase the corresponding position by 1%.
This magnitude of social inﬂuence reaches its maximum during the economic
crisis 2008/09, which suggests that fund managers are more strongly inﬂu-
enced by others in times of an economic downturn. More than 90% of the
magnitude of inﬂuence is due to pure observation. While the magnitude of
this observational inﬂuence varies much in time, the magnitude of inﬂuence
resulting from the exchange of opinion stays more or less constant.
6The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In chapter 2, I present
the empirical model and introduce a robust estimation procedure. Chapter
3 serves to present the dataset used for the empirical analysis in chapter 4.
Chapter 6 concludes.
2. Methology
For the empirical analysis, I make use of the standard linear model to
identify social interactions based on network structures (e.g. Bramoull´ e et al.
(2009); Lee et al. (2010)):7
wict = δt
X
j6=i
γijtwjct + xictβt + ict, (1)
where wict is the portfolio weight fund manager i puts on the stock of company
c at time t. The row vector xict contains exogenous control variables that are
decisive for the portfolio decision. The coeﬃcient δt captures the magnitude
of average contemporaneous inﬂuence that fund managers have on each other.
The inﬂuence of a single fund manager j on fund manager i is weighted by
γijt ≥ 0.8 The weighting coeﬃcients are normalised, such that
X
j6=i
γijt =

1 if fund manager i is inﬂuenced by at least one other fund manager
0 otherwise . (2)
This ensures, that δt captures the total magnitude of social inﬂuence. As it
is usual in the social interaction literature, I consider strategic complemen-
tarities, i.e. δt ≥ 0. This is the only assumption imposed on the coeﬃcients
of the model and can be justiﬁed as follows. Consider two fund managers,
where one acts as a net buyer while the other is a net seller. Their portfolio
weights are thus negatively related, which could be expressed by a negative
value of δt. This relationship, however, does not represent a form of social
7Contrary to the social interaction literature, I do not consider contextual eﬀects, i.e.
the inﬂuence of an individual’s characteristics on the outcome of an other individual, as
it is unlikely that a mutual fund manager’s decisions are inﬂuenced by the background of
another fund manager.
8More general than in the social interaction literature, I do not assume that a fund
manager is equally inﬂuenced by other fund managers. This means, the values of γijt do
not have to be equal for ﬁxed i and t.
7inﬂuence the fund managers have on each other.
Regarding the error term of the model, I assume that ict is heteroskedastic,
which might come up by the exogenous variables xict but is also due to the
boundedness of the dependent variable wict between zero and one. Moreover,
I assume that the values of ict are correlated for ﬁxed i and t, because by
deﬁnition portfolio weights of one fund manager at one point of time have
to sum up to one. However, unlike in other social interaction settings (e.g.
Lee et al. (2010)), I do not assume that ict is correlated in between diﬀerent
fund managers, i.e. for varying i. This is justiﬁed by the fact, that the group
of analysed fund managers can be considered to be homogeneous enough,
such that the bias induced by individual (unobserved) characteristics can be
neglected.
For notational convenience, equation 1 can be rewritten in a matrix form
wt = δtΓtwt + Xtβt + t. (3)
If Γt is known, then identiﬁcation of the coeﬃcients δt and βt is possible.
However, they cannot be consistently estimated by OLS, because from the
reduced form of equation 3
wt = (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t). (4)
it follows that
E(Γtwt,t) = E(Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t),t) = σ
2
t tr(Γt((I − δtΓt)). (5)
Hence, the regressor Γtwt is correlated with the error term. The problem
can be illustrated as follows. Regressing wict on wjct yields the inﬂuence fund
manager j has on fund manager i plus the inﬂuence fund manager i has on
fund manager j. Hence, the estimates of the inﬂuence are upward biased.9
In order to overcome this problem, Kelejian and Prucha (1998) proposed a
three step procedure that has been reﬁned by Lee (2003). As stated above, I
do not assume that the error term is correlated across fund managers. In this
case, the three step procedure reduces to a two step procedure and I proceed
like in Bramoull´ e et al. (2009). In the ﬁrst step, equation 3 is estimated by
9Lee (2002) has shown that this bias vanishes, if the overall inﬂuence of an individual
is very small. My results however suggest that the inﬂuential network of fund managers
is sparse, such that the inﬂuence of a single fund manager indeed is not neglectible.
8a 2SLS estimator using the instruments Z = [ΓtXt,Xt]. In the appendix, it
is shown that these instruments can be used, if Xt is uncorrelated with the
error term and if the spectral radius of δtΓt is smaller than one. While the
ﬁrst condition is assumed to be generally fulﬁlled, the second will have to
be veriﬁed after having obtained the results. The resulting estimates of the
coeﬃcients λt = [δt,βt
0]0 are given by
ˆ λt = (QZ(Z
0Z)
−1ZQ)
−1QZ(Z
0Z)
−1Zwt, (6)
with Q = [Γtwt,Xt]. The second step, also consists of a 2SLS estimator.
This time the instruments ˜ Z = [Γtˆ wt,Xt] are used, where ˆ wt is the consistent
estimate of portfolio weights from the ﬁrst step and results by plugging in ˆ δt
and ˆ βt into equation 4. Since the 2SLS estimator of the second step is just
identiﬁed, the estimates of the coeﬃcients λt from the second step are given
by
ˆ ˆ λt = (˜ ZQ)
−1˜ Zˆ wt (7)
In order to account for the assumed heteroskedasticity and within portfolio
correlated error term (clustered errors), the variance of the coeﬃcients is
estimated by
V (ˆ ˆ λt) = (˜ ZQ)
−1˜ Z
0Ω˜ Z(˜ ZQ)
−1, (8)
with the block matrix Ω that contains the estimates of the error variance and
the within portfolio correlation obtained by the second step.
As stated above, identiﬁcation of δt and βt is possible if Γt is known. If
Γt is not given, it is still possible make assumptions about its structure.
Hong et al. (2005) for instance assume that γijt is only unequal zero if fund
manager i and j work in the same city. This is reasonable, because they
are only interested in word-of-mouth eﬀects that are stronger expressed, if
fund managers work near by and can regularly meet each other. Pomorski
(2009) is more concerned with the inﬂuence that results from observing fund
managers with high past performance. He assumes that γijt only takes values
unequal zero if fund manager i showed poor past performance while fund
manager j performed well. With my paper, I intend to capture both, the
inﬂuence form the exchange of opinions as well as from pure observation.
For this reason, I do not impose any assumptions on the structure of Γt,
but determine it endogenously. Therefore, I estimate equation 3 for every
9possible combination10 of fund manager i∗ and j∗ by setting
γijt =

1 if i = i∗ and j = j∗
0 otherwise . (9)
The inﬂuence of fund manager j∗ on fund manager i∗ is then given by δt. As
stated above, equation 3 cannot be consistently estimated by OLS, because
the estimates of the inﬂuence from fund manager j∗ on fund manager i∗ also
contain the inﬂuence in the opposite direction. The problem does not even
vanish if inﬂuence is unidirectional. This is due to the fact that imposing
constraint 9 introduces an omitted variable problem, because the inﬂuence
of fund managers j 6= j∗ is neglected. A solution consists in also applying
the procedure of Kelejian and Prucha (1998) and Lee (2003). However, the
second step is not feasible, because it is made use of the estimated weights ˆ wt
that can only be obtained if the inﬂuence of all fund managers on a particular
fund manager is considered. Nevertheless, the ﬁrst step can be conducted
and although Lee (2003) stated that the estimates of the ﬁrst step11 are not
optimal, they are still consistent. With the estimates of the ﬁrst step, the
matrix Γt is then constructed as follows. If fund manager j∗ does not have
a positive inﬂuence on investor i∗ on a 5% level signiﬁcance, then γi∗j∗t is set
equal to zero. Otherwise, the magnitude of inﬂuence is normalised through
the division by the summed inﬂuence of all other fund managers j 6= j∗ on
fund manager i∗ and is assigned to γi∗j∗t.
One remaining important question is how to deal with ”zero weights”. Port-
folios weights of stocks that are not held by a fund manager are implicitly
equal to zero. Considering every stock in the world, most of the elements
of the vector wt would be zero. This leads to two problems. First, it has
to be accounted for a censored dependent variable. This could either be
done by applying a likelihood technique or for instance by using the estima-
tor proposed by Honor´ e and Leth-Petersen (2007) that does not rely on any
10In order to ensure enough degrees of freedom for the empirical analysis, I require two
fund managers to hold at least 30 stocks in common at a particular point of time, such that
a social inﬂuence might be considered. Otherwise, γijt is set to zero. This is a reasonable
approach, because a fund manager cannot be inﬂuenced by other fund managers who hold
completely diﬀerent portfolios.
11Actually, Lee (2003) showed that the estimators of the third step in the three step
procedure proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) are not optimal. However, assuming
that the error term is not correlated across fund managers, the ﬁrst and the third step in
Kelejian and Prucha (1998) are equal.
10assumption regarding the error distribution. While the ﬁrst problem thus
is solvable, there is another which is more crucial, because it induces the
risk of false inference regarding fund managers’ reciprocal inﬂuence. It arises
from the fact that fund managers will have a lot of zero weights in common.
This could erroneously be interpreted as empirical evidence for strong social
inﬂuence that prevents fund managers from holding particular stocks, while
in truth these fund managers might just be restricted by their investment
policies not to buy these stocks. Hong et al. (2005) try to solve this prob-
lem by restricting the ”universe” of potential investment opportunities to the
stocks of the 2000 largest companies. This reduces the problem. But the risk
of false inference still is high, if fund managers rather hold stocks of small
companies, which leads to a lot of zero weights regarding the stocks of the
larger companies. I confront this problem by only analysing non zero portfo-
lio weights on the left hand side of equation 3. This has to be kept in mind
for the interpretation of the results, because it means that the magnitude
of inﬂuence only represents the inﬂuence for holding a stock and putting a
speciﬁc weight on it. The inﬂuence for not holding a particular stock is not
captured. This might be a little drawback of my approach. Nevertheless,
it ensures robust results, because the magnitude of inﬂuence is rather un-
derestimated. Note, that on the right hand side of equation 3, the resulting
vector of Γtwt still may contain zeros, if a fund manager holds a stock that
is not held by any other fund manager at a speciﬁc point of time. This can
be illustrated by having a closer look to the structure of mathbfΓt, which is
given by
Γt =

  

0C1t×C1t γ12tMC1t×C2t ... γ1NtMC1t×CNt
γ21tMC2t×C1t 0C2t×C2t ... γ2NtMC2t×CNt
. . .
. . . ... . . .
γN1tMCNt×C1t γN2tMCNt×C2t ... 0CNt×CNt

  

, (10)
where 0Cit×Cit is a Cit ×Cit matrix of zeros and Cit stands for the number of
stocks fund manager i holds at time t. MCit×Cjt is a Cit ×Cjt matrix that is
in principle an identity matrix but the cth column is missing if fund manager
i holds the stock of company c and fund manager j does not. Considering
two fund managers, where one holds stock 1 and stock 2 and the other only
holds stock 1, the vector of portfolio weights on the left hand side of equation
113 is given by
wt =


w11t
w12t
w21t

. (11)
On the right hand side, the matrix Γt has the structure
Γt =


0 0 γ12t
0 0 0
γ21t 0 0

, (12)
such that the product
Γtwt =


γ12tw21t
0
γ21tw11t

 (13)
contains zeros.
3. Data
The data regarding portfolio compositions of mutual funds has been ob-
tained from the ThomsonReuters ownership database. I selected only funds
that had invested at least $ 10 million in companies of the DAX30 as of
December 31st 2010. For these funds all obtainable sets of portfolios compo-
sitions have been taken in the period from 2002 to 2010. They were available
either on a quarterly or on a semi-annually basis. Moreover, I also retrieved
information about the particular fund and the engaged fund manager. This
set of information contains the orientation (active/passive) of the fund as well
as the working location of the fund manager. The ﬁnal database contains
1943 funds with 5,809,739 portfolio weights.12 On December 31st 2010, the
total money invested by these funds in companies of the DAX30 amounts to
approximately one third of the total DAX30 market capitalisation.
In order to properly disentangle the reciprocal inﬂuence of fund managers,
it is import to ﬁnd strong exogenous variables that explain their investment
behaviour (matrix Xt in equation 3). Otherwise, spurious correlation might
be interpreted as intentional inﬂuence. In his survey about the investment
12In order to put these numbers into a perspective, note that e.g. Hong et al. (2005)
used data of 1635 funds during a two-year period, which leads to less than a quarter of
the number of observations used in this paper.
12behaviour of fund managers, Arnswald (2001) detects that investment deci-
sions regarding a particular stock are primary based fundamental valuations,
past stock returns and a general portfolio optimisation. In order to cap-
ture these components, I enriched database of portfolio weights by market
data obtained from Bloomberg. For 16,732 companies of those that are held
by at least one fund manager at at least one point of time, stock prices
and analysts’ consensus price targets as well as the mean value of the three
consensus earnings forecasts referring to the three ﬁscal years following a
particular date have been obtained. Moreover, the corresponding P/E ratio
has been retrieved. Comparability is ensured by converting all quotes to
euro with the prevailing exchange rates. This market data has then matched
with the portfolio data in the following way. For every point of time where
a set of portfolio composition has been available, the average and volatility
of daily stock price returns in the preceding quarter has been calculated and
matched with the relevant portfolio weight. The same has been done with
price targets, averaged earnings forecasts and P/E ratios. The two former
have both been normalised by the stock price such that they represent fore-
casted returns. In order to account for the individual portfolio situation of
a fund manager, I relate these four variables to other stocks his portfolio
at a speciﬁc point of time. Therefore, I take the diﬀerence of a particu-
lar variable and its average that is weighted with the portfolio weights of
all other stocks this fund manager holds at a speciﬁc point of time. The
resulting variables are DIFF RET, DIFF VOLA, DIFF PT, DIFF EARN,
DIFF P/E and denote the diﬀerence of average daily stock returns, of the
volatility of daily stock returns, of normalised price targets, of normalised
earnings forecasts and of the price earnings ratio, respectively. In order to
illustrate this data preparation, consider a portfolio with four stocks that
are weighted with 50%, 25%, 12.5% and 12.5%, respectively. The average of
daily stock returns in the preceding quarter shall amount to 2%, 1%, 3% and
5%, respectively. Then the value of DIFF RET for the ﬁrst stock is given
by 2% − (0.25 · 1% + 0.125 · 3% + 0.125 · 5%) = 0.75%. Turning back to
the main determinants of investment decisions, DIFF PT, DIFF EARN and
DIFF P/E account for fundamental valuations. Past stock returns are cap-
tured by DIFF RET and it is accounted for portfolio optimisation by both,
DIFF RET and DIFF VOLA.
Walter and Weber (2006) stated that a large portion of similar behaviour
among mutual fund managers can be explained by variations of underlying
benchmark indices. Hence, a variable that captures this eﬀect is needed.
13Therefore, the underlying benchmark of every fund manager has to known.
Among all 1943 fund managers in the database, there are 277 that have a
passive orientation. This means these fund managers choose portfolio weights
such that they just replicate a particular index. Hence, by deﬁnition they
cannot by inﬂuenced by other fund managers and are excluded for the em-
pirical analysis. However, their portfolio weights can be used as benchmark
weights for the remaining 1666 active portfolio managers. Therefore, I re-
gressed the weights of every active fund manager on the weights of every
passive fund manager. If the coeﬃcient of this bivariate regression turned
out to be positive and signiﬁcant at a 5% level, I concluded that the weights
of the passive fund manager serve as a benchmark for the active fund man-
ager. In case, there are more than one passive fund managers whose portfolio
weights can be used as a benchmark for one active fund manager, I consid-
ered the average that has been weighted by the magnitude of the regression
coeﬃcients. This situation occurs, if there are several passive fund managers
that replicate the same index or if an index is included in another index. The
resulting variable is denoted BENCHMARK.
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) provided empirical evidence, that fund man-
agers are more likely to invest in the stocks of companies that are located
near by. In order to account for this eﬀect, I retrieved information about the
location of the headquarters for the afore mentioned 16,732 companies from
ThomsonReuters. Thereof, I created two dummy variables. CITY takes the
value one if a fund manager works in the city where the headquarters of the
company, he invested in, is located. COUNTRY equals one if the headquar-
ter is not located in the same city but in the same country.
In order to illustrate how the group of the analysed 1666 active fund managers
is composed, table 1 gives an overview of the families the funds belong to.
This list is restricted to fund families with at least 10 funds in the database.
Table 2 shows the working locations of the managers of the analysed fund by
country and city. Note that the list of cities only contains those cities where at
least 10 fund managers work. Removing the portfolios weights of the passive
fund managers reduces the dataset to 4,399,889 observations. Table 3 pro-
vides summary statistics for the corresponding variable PORT WEIGHT and
all other afore mentioned variables. Please note, that market data has been
corrected by outliers (upper and lower 1% percentiles). The mean portfolio
weight equals 0.64%. This means, that in the average a fund manager holds
156 stocks at a particular point of time. Table 4 shows how the number of
funds and available portfolio weight is distributed over the period from 2002
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Table 1: Overview of the fund families of the analysed active
funds
Fund Family Frequency relative Frequency
Allianz Global Investors Kapitalanlagegesellschaft mbH 82 4.9%
MFS Investment Management 42 2.5%
DWS Investment GmbH 41 2.5%
Union Investment Group 39 2.3%
Fidelity Management & Research 38 2.3%
Deutsche Asset Management Investmentgesellschaft mbH 29 1.7%
AllianceBernstein L.P. 28 1.7%
Fidelity International Limited 28 1.7%
Deka Investment GmbH 27 1.6%
ING Investment Management (Netherlands) 26 1.6%
Amundi Asset Management 23 1.4%
Templeton Investment Counsel, LLC 22 1.3%
JPMorgan Asset Management U.K. Limited 21 1.3%
Wellington Management Company, LLP 20 1.2%
UBS Global Asset Management (Switzerland) 19 1.1%
Swedbank Robur AB 18 1.1%
Newton Investment Management Ltd. 18 1.1%
BNP Paribas Asset Management S.A.S. 16 1.0%
Aberdeen Asset Management (Edinburgh) 15 0.9%
Schroder Investment Management Ltd. (SIM) 15 0.9%
Invesco Advisers, Inc. 14 0.8%
La Banque Postale Asset Management 14 0.8%
AllianceBernstein Ltd. (Value) 13 0.8%
Henderson Global Investors Ltd. 13 0.8%
M & G Investment Management Ltd. 12 0.7%
OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 12 0.7%
Franklin Mutual Advisers, LLC 12 0.7%
BlackRock Investment Management (UK) Ltd. 11 0.7%
Danske Capital 11 0.7%
Dexia Asset Management Belgium S.A. 11 0.7%
Aviva Investors France S.A. 10 0.6%
Natixis Asset Management 10 0.6%
The list of fund families is restricted to those with at least 10 funds in the database.
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Table 2: Overview of the working locations of the analysed active
funds
Country Frequency rel. Frequency City Frequency rel. Frequency
United States 448 26.9% London 261 15.7%
Germany 332 19.9% Frankfurt 255 15.3%
United Kingdom 306 18.4% Boston 136 8.2%
France 147 8.8% Paris 134 8.0%
Switzerland 65 3.9% New York 107 6.4%
Sweden 49 2.9% Stockholm 48 2.9%
Canada 43 2.6% Zurich 43 2.6%
Netherlands 40 2.4% Edinburgh 41 2.5%
Belgium 37 2.2% Brussels 36 2.2%
Italy 37 2.2% Milan 33 2.0%
Luxembourg 29 1.7% Toronto 32 1.9%
Denmark 27 1.6% Luxembourg 28 1.7%
Ireland 22 1.3% The Hague 26 1.6%
Japan 16 1.0% Copenhagen 23 1.4%
Spain 16 1.0% Dublin 22 1.3%
Bahamas 12 0.7% Cologne 22 1.3%
Norway 9 0.5% Chicago 22 1.3%
Austria 8 0.5% Denver 16 1.0%
Australia 4 0.2% Tokyo 16 1.0%
Portugal 4 0.2% Geneva 12 0.7%
Finland 3 0.2% Madrid 12 0.7%
South Africa 2 0.1% Los Angeles 12 0.7%
Liechtenstein 2 0.1% Short Hills 12 0.7%
n.a. 2 0.1% Nassau 12 0.7%
Singapore 2 0.1% Puteaux 11 0.7%
Hong Kong 1 0.1% Fort Lauderdale 11 0.7%
Greece 1 0.1% San Francisco 10 0.6%
Taiwan 1 0.1% Munich 10 0.6%
Bermuda 1 0.1%
1666 100%
The list of cities is restricted to those where at least 10 active fund managers work.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
PORT WEIGHT 0.006396 0.012125 0.000000 1.000000 4,399,889
DIFF RET -0.000364 0.002410 -0.012611 0.007152 3,679,430
DIFF VOLA 0.000477 0.000790 -0.005347 0.006336 3,679,431
DIFF PT -0.018298 0.194100 -0.854410 1.337569 3,109,250
DIFF EARN -0.003905 0.035997 -0.152663 0.185215 2,801,973
DIFF P/E -0.130618 11.708073 -64.667999 75.106094 2,786,845
BENCHMARK 0.000240 0.001264 0.000000 0.159050 3,724,983
CITY 0.028229 0.165625 0.000000 1.000000 3,796,512
COUNTRY 0.157178 0.363968 0.000000 1.000000 4,399,889
The portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a speciﬁc stock at a particular point
time is given by PORT WEIGHT. DIFF RET, DIFF VOLA, DIFF PT, DIFF EARN,
DIFF P/E denote the three months average daily stock return, the three months volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speciﬁc weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speciﬁc
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city like the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country like the company whose stock he holds.
17to 2010. The average number of analysed funds per half-year equals 1164.
This means that not all 1666 fund managers can be examined at the same
time. Particularly, the number of fund managers that are observed in the sec-
ond half-year of 2010 is considerably lower than in the ﬁrst half-year of 2010.
This is due to the fact, that the data has been retrieved at the beginning of
2011, when not all funds had already reported their portfolio weights for the
end of 2010. The empirical results, however, are not aﬀected by this varia-
tion, because the magnitude of social inﬂuence is determined separately for
every half-year and because it can be assumed, that errors induced by missing
funds are not systematic. In table 5 the cross correlations of all variables are
given. As one would expect, PORT WEIGHT is positively correlated with
DIFF RET, DIFF EARN, BENCHMARK, CITY and COUNTRY whereas
PORT WEIGHT and DIFF VOLA are negatively correlated. This suggests
that a fund manager puts more weight on stocks with higher average daily
returns, with higher analysts’ earnings forecasts, with a higher weight in the
relevant benchmark portfolio and on those stock where he works near the
headquarter of emitting company. Less weight is assigned to stocks with a
higher return volatility. Surprisingly, PORT WEIGHT is negatively corre-
lated with DIFF PT, which indicates that a high return implied by analysts’
price targets leads to a lower portfolio weight of a particular stock. The
price earning ratio does not seem to be decisive for fund managers’ portfolio
selections as the corresponding correlation coeﬃcient is almost zero and not
signiﬁcant on a 10% level.
4. Results
In the following, I test the three hypotheses of the paper. Therefore, I
determine the magnitude of social inﬂuence among fund managers, divide
it into observational inﬂuence and inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion
and relate it to the prevailing market environment. First, I select the vari-
ables that are relevant for the portfolio selection. The correlation coeﬃcients
provided in the preceding chapter all showed the expected sign, except for
DIFF PT and DIFF P/E. In order to capture correctly the fundamental
component, diﬀerent speciﬁcations with the three fundamental variables are
tested within an OLS panel regression with ﬁxed eﬀects on the fund manager
level. The results are shown in table 6. It can be seen that DIFF EARN has
the highest relevance, such that I use the variables of the third speciﬁcation
for the analysis of inﬂuence.
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Table 4: Temporal distribution of the number of funds and
portfolio weights
N K
2002/I 122,120 851
2002/II 139,790 949
2003/I 144,382 965
2003/II 160,395 1029
2004/I 167,069 1007
2004/II 203,472 1102
2005/I 211,041 1084
2005/II 242,202 1169
2006/I 248,259 1201
2006/II 272,548 1263
2007/I 274,041 1261
2007/II 301,352 1398
2008/I 332,090 1401
2008/II 323,982 1427
2009/I 342,310 1461
2009/II 383,330 1482
2010/I 311,922 1082
2010/II 219,584 824
sum / mean 4,399,889 1164
N is the number of available portfolio weights per half-year that are provided by K fund
managers.
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Table 5: Matrix of Cross Correlations
Variables PORT WEIGHT DIFF RET DIFF VOLA DIFF PT DIFF EARN DIFF P/E BENCHMARK CITY
DIFF RET 0.058
(0.000)
DIFF VOLA -0.082 0.079
(0.000) (0.000)
DIFF PT -0.018 -0.219 0.191
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIFF EARN 0.043 -0.114 0.130 0.305
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DIFF P/E -0.001 0.058 -0.043 -0.127 -0.316
(0.199) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BENCHMARK 0.233 0.009 -0.051 -0.010 0.034 -0.022
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CITY 0.075 0.006 0.010 0.004 0.022 -0.000 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.734) (0.000)
COUNTRY 0.037 -0.007 0.004 0.047 -0.030 -0.021 0.026 -0.080
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
The portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a speciﬁc stock at a particular point
time is given by PORT WEIGHT. DIFF RET, DIFF VOLA, DIFF PT, DIFF EARN,
DIFF P/E denote the three months average daily stock return, the three months volatil-
ity of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average
earnings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfo-
lio speciﬁc weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speciﬁc
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is relevant
for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables. CITY
equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city like the company whose stock
he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work in the same
city but in the same country like the company whose stock he holds. The table contains
the correlation coeﬃcients. P-values are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 6: OLS panel regression with ﬁxed eﬀects on the fund
manager level
Speciﬁcation I Speciﬁcation II Speciﬁcation III Speciﬁcation IV
DIFF RET 0.14133∗∗∗ 0.12958∗∗∗ 0.15040∗∗∗ 0.13368∗∗∗
(0.00204) (0.00193) (0.00187) (0.00187)
DIFF VOLA −0.67585∗∗∗ −0.65888∗∗∗ −0.70066∗∗∗ −0.64053∗∗∗
(0.00647) (0.00606) (0.00597) (0.00583)
DIFF PT −0.00081∗∗∗ −0.00005∗
(0.00003) (0.00002)
DIFF EARN 0.01112∗∗∗ 0.01130∗∗∗
(0.00015) (0.00013)
DIFF P/E −0.00001∗∗∗ −0.00002∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000)
BENCHMARK 1.20364∗∗∗ 1.08347∗∗∗ 1.21971∗∗∗ 1.23161∗∗∗
(0.00496) (0.00401) (0.00482) (0.00486)
CITY 0.00272∗∗∗ 0.00288∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗ 0.00269∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003)
COUNTRY 0.00128∗∗∗ 0.00121∗∗∗ 0.00122∗∗∗ 0.00114∗∗∗
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002)
CONST 0.00556∗∗∗ 0.00553∗∗∗ 0.00552∗∗∗ 0.00545∗∗∗
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001)
N 2,160,103 2,536,435 2,331,492 2,312,400
The dependent variable is given by the portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on
a speciﬁc stock at a particular point. DIFF RET, DIFF VOLA, DIFF PT, DIFF EARN,
DIFF P/E denote the three months average daily stock return, the three months volatility
of daily stock returns, the normalised price target, the normalised three years average earn-
ings forecast and the price earnings ratio, respectively, minus the corresponding portfolio
speciﬁc weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight a speciﬁc
stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers that is rele-
vant for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy variables.
CITY equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city like the company
whose stock he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does not work
in the same city but in the same country like the company whose stock he holds. The
table contains the regression coeﬃcients that result by an OLS panel regression with ﬁxed
eﬀects on the fund manager level. The signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients is indicated by stars (*
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding standard deviations are reported
in parenthesis.
21I estimate the coeﬃcients of equation 3 for every half-year from 2005 to 2010.
The years from 2002 to 2004 are skipped, because the number of available
earnings forecasts in the database is too low.13 For every half-year, I further
remove all funds where not at least 30 portfolios weights have been available.
This ensures enough degrees of freedom for the empirical analysis. As de-
scribed in chapter 2, the matrix Γt is determined by pair wise regressions.
Therefore, PORT WEIGHT is used for wt and the columns of the matrix Xt
consist of the variables DIFF RET, DIFF VOLA, DIFF EARN, BENCH-
MARK, CITY, COUNTRY as well as of a row vector of ones in order to
introduce a constant term. Remind, that the matrix of instruments is given
by Z = [ΓtXt,Xt]. If however, some variables are identical for the two fund
managers under consideration, then the columns of Z result to be collinear.
This can be demonstrated by the constant term that by deﬁnition always is
a column vector of ones. The matrix of instruments can be written as
Z = [Γt[X
(1−6)
t ,c],[X
(1−6)
t ,c]], (14)
with c being a column vector of ones. The matrix X
(1−6)
t contains the other
variables as explained above. Now, equation 14 can be reformulated as
Z = [ΓtX
(1−6)
t ,Γtc,X
(1−6)
t ,c]. (15)
The rows of Γt are normalised, such that the single row elements sum up
to one. This yields Γtc = c. Hence, the 7th and the 14th column of ma-
trix Z are identical and thus collinear. This problem of colinearity might
also occur for the variables BENCHMARK, CITY or COUNTRY, if fund
managers have the same benchmark or work in the same city or country, re-
spectively. In order to rule out the potential problem, I use the instruments
Z = [ΓtX
(1−3)
t ,Xt], where the matrix X
(1−3)
t only consists of the variables
DIFF RET, DIFF VOLA and DIFF EARN that are guaranteed to be in-
dividual for every fund manager as they depend on the speciﬁc portfolio
compositions. Regarding the timing of possible inﬂuence, I assume that fund
managers can only be inﬂuenced by other fund managers if they published
their portfolio weights within the same month and at that time held at least
30 stocks in common. Moreover, I do not examine the reciprocal inﬂuence of
13Removing the variable DIFF EARN and including the years 2002 to 2004 qualitatively
leads to the same results.
22funds that belong to the same fund family, because this does not represent
a form of external inﬂuence.
After having obtained the matrix Γt, the two step procedure outlined in chap-
ter 2 can be applied in order to estimate the coeﬃcients δt and βt for every
half-year. The vector wt and the matrix Xt are deﬁned as explained above
for the determination of Γt. This time however, I use Z = [ΓtX
(1−6)
t ,Xt] as
set of instruments, where X
(1−6)
t contains the same column like Xt except
the vector of ones. This choice is justiﬁed by the fact, that not all fund
managers neither have the same benchmark, nor work in the same city or
country, respectively, such that only the column vector of ones could generate
a collinearity. The estimation results are shown in table 7. It can be seen,
that all values of δt are lower than one. As the matrix Γt is row normalised
by equation 2, i.e. the single row elements sum up to one, the spectral radius
of δtΓt is also always lower than one. Hence, the instruments used for the
estimation procedure are valid.
The average estimate of the coeﬃcient δt equals 0.6878. This means that
an average increase of 1% in portfolio weights by the relevant fund man-
agers of the underlying inﬂuential network leads to an increase of 0.69% for a
particular fund manager. Among the variables that are decisive for the port-
folio selection, BENCHMARK has a considerable eﬀect. The corresponding
average coeﬃcient of 1.2282 is greater than one, which thus suggests that
portfolio managers generally hold fewer stocks than are included in all rele-
vant indices. Therefore, variations in the benchmark portfolio translate into
higher variations in an individual portfolio. Moreover, in the average, an in-
crease of DIFF RET and DIFF EARN and a decrease of DIFF VOLA each
by one standard deviation leads to an increase in portfolio weights by 0.04%,
0.03% and 0.09%, respectively. Interestingly, the regression coeﬃcients for
DIFF VOLA are considerable smaller in the second half-year of 2008 and
the ﬁrst half-year of 2009, which results from the high volatility most of
the stocks experienced during that period of time. Fund managers tend to
put 0.02% more portfolio weight on stocks, if they work in the city, where
the headquarters of the emitting company is located. 0.01% more portfolio
weight is chosen, if not the city but at least the country is equal. The result-
ing variations appear to be low. However, remind that the average portfolio
weight equals 0.64%. The afore presented results show, that although after
controlling for the key determinants of the portfolio selection, the eﬀect of
social inﬂuence among fund managers is statistically and economically sig-
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Table 7: Estimation results for the magnitude of social inﬂuence δt
δt DIFF RET DIFF VOLA DIFF EARN BENCHMARK CITY COUNTRY CONST N/K
2005/I 0.6804∗∗∗ 0.1973∗∗∗ −2.9388∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.9845∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 30,965
(0.0206) (0.0250) (0.1539) (0.0011) (0.0760) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) 415
2005/II 0.7809∗∗∗ 0.1567∗∗∗ −0.9084∗∗∗ 0.0096∗∗∗ 1.1204∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗∗ 0.0015∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 132,884
(0.0226) (0.0119) (0.1333) (0.0010) (0.1502) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 901
2006/I 0.6645∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗ −1.1161∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 2.0421∗∗∗ 0.0017∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 140,871
(0.0170) (0.0140) (0.0841) (0.0008) (0.1782) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 895
2006/II 0.6516∗∗∗ 0.1056∗∗∗ −0.8132∗∗∗ 0.0104∗∗∗ 1.1843∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗ 169,451
(0.0106) (0.0077) (0.0647) (0.0009) (0.1183) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 967
2007/I 0.6867∗∗∗ 0.1735∗∗∗ −1.8908∗∗∗ 0.0164∗∗∗ 1.1092∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0013∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 179,348
(0.0143) (0.0104) (0.0785) (0.0009) (0.2454) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 961
2007/II 0.6606∗∗∗ 0.2970∗∗∗ −1.1007∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.3769∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 207,838
(0.0097) (0.0058) (0.0327) (0.0007) (0.0649) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) 1116
2008/I 0.6654∗∗∗ 0.1564∗∗∗ −1.0590∗∗∗ 0.0067∗∗∗ 1.2108∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 249,314
(0.0087) (0.0043) (0.0169) (0.0003) (0.0545) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1237
2008/II 0.7693∗∗∗ 0.2170∗∗∗ −0.3005∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 1.2342∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 234,275
(0.0100) (0.0036) (0.0090) (0.0003) (0.0659) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1262
2009/I 0.7095∗∗∗ 0.0646∗∗∗ −0.6326∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 2.3453∗∗∗ 0.0028∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 255,197
(0.0092) (0.0039) (0.0118) (0.0002) (0.1217) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1369
2009/II 0.7247∗∗∗ 0.1393∗∗∗ −1.0176∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.7959∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 303,547
(0.0082) (0.0039) (0.0174) (0.0002) (0.0471) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 1411
2010/I 0.5917∗∗∗ 0.0726∗∗∗ −0.9350∗∗∗ 0.0101∗∗∗ 1.0187∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 247,488
(0.0099) (0.0043) (0.0180) (0.0003) (0.0579) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 957
2010/II 0.6571∗∗∗ 0.1344∗∗∗ −1.2916∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 1.3203∗∗∗ 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 172,590
(0.0173) (0.0058) (0.0309) (0.0003) (0.0787) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) 698
mean 0.6878 0.1466 -1.1668 0.0091 1.2282 0.0024 0.0011 0.0050 193,647
The dependent variable is given by the portfolio weight an active fund manager puts on a
speciﬁc stock at a particular point. DIFF RET, DIFF VOLA, DIFF EARN, denote the
three months average daily stock return, the three months volatility of daily stock returns
and the normalised three years average earnings, respectively, minus the corresponding
portfolio speciﬁc weighted mean value. BENCHMARK represents the portfolio weight
a speciﬁc stock receives in the average benchmark portfolio of passive fund managers
that is relevant for a particular active fund manager. CITY and COUNTRY are dummy
variables. CITY equals one if an active fund managers works in the same city like the
company whose stock he holds. COUNTRY is equal to one if an active fund manager does
not work in the same city but in the same country like the company whose stock he holds.
N represents the number of observation and K the number of fund managers used in the
empirical analysis. The table contains the regression coeﬃcients that are obtained by the
two step estimation as explained in the text. The signiﬁcance of coeﬃcients is indicated
by stars (* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01). The corresponding standard deviations
are reported in parenthesis.
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Table 8: Network dynamics
num all links
num all possible links
num unweighted city links
num all links
num weighted city links
num all links
2005/I 0.58% 7.7% 10.75%
2005/II 0.60% 10.9% 11.28%
2006/I 0.53% 9.2% 9.38%
2006/II 0.59% 9.5% 9.15%
2007/I 0.59% 8.3% 8.42%
2007/II 0.55% 9.2% 9.45%
2008/I 0.62% 7.9% 8.49%
2008/II 0.64% 9.8% 7.16%
2009/I 0.85% 7.2% 7.64%
2009/II 0.92% 7.0% 7.94%
2010/I 0.76% 7.6% 7.30%
2010/II 0.53% 7.7% 6.50%
mean 0.65% 8.49% 8.62%
The ﬁrst column displays the total network density. The second column shows the portion
of network density that is generated by intra-city links. The third column also contains the
portion of network density resulting from intra-city links, however, every link is weighted
with the corresponding coeﬃcient γijt.
niﬁcant. This corroborates my ﬁrst hypothesis.
Table 8 shows the evolution of the network density over time. The network
density is deﬁned by the number of all network links given by Γt divided by
the number of all possible network links. The number of all possible links
is given by K(K − 1), where K is the number of fund managers that are
analysed in a particular half-year. Following Hong et al. (2005), I deﬁne
the inﬂuence between fund managers that work in the same city as inﬂuence
from the exchange of opinion. Table 8 also provides the fraction of the total
density that is due to links that connect fund managers in the same city. The
relevance of the inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion can be expressed more
precisely, if every intra-city link is weighted with the corresponding coeﬃcient
γijt. The resulting weighted fraction of the total density is also displayed in
table 8. The mean network density equals 0.65%. This means the underlying
inﬂuential network is very sparse. In the average, a particular fund manager
is inﬂuenced by 6.6 other fund managers. The mean portion of weighted and
25unweighted network links that connect fund managers within the same city
are quite similar and equal 8.49% and 8.62%, respectively. Hence, 8.49% of
the average network density is due intra-city links and 8.62% of the average
magnitude of social inﬂuence results from intra-city inﬂuence. The latter
means that, in the average, a fund manager increases the portfolio weight of
a particular stock by 0.06%, if the fund managers, with whom he exchanges
his opinion, increase the corresponding portfolio weight by 1%. It can be
stated that the portion of intra-city inﬂuence slightly decreases slightly over
time, which could be due to the eﬀect of increasing globalisation.
In order to test the second and third hypothesis, the magnitude of social
inﬂuence and the density of the underlying inﬂuential network are related
to the prevailing market environment represented by the dynamics of the
DAX30. Figure 1(a) shows the magnitude of inﬂuence as well as the network
density. Figure 1(b) displays the magnitude of inﬂuence, that is due to fund
managers working in the same city as well as the network density resulting
from links between those fund managers. In ﬁgure 1(c) the price level of
the DAX30 and the volatility of daily returns for every half-year during the
period of analysis are shown. One can see that the magnitude of inﬂuence
has been on a stable level of about 0.67 since 2006. A sudden increase can
be observed at the beginning of the recent economic crisis in the second half-
year of 2008, where the level of the DAX30 was low and the volatility of
stock returns was high. As the bottom line of the DAX30 level was reached
and returns began to get positive again, the magnitude of inﬂuence decreased
under the level before the crisis and turned back to this level in the second
half-year of 2010. Surprisingly, there is a singular peak in the magnitude
of inﬂuence in the second half-year of 2005 that does not correspond to a
speciﬁc evolution of the DAX30. The density of the underlying inﬂuential
network remained stable on the level of about 0.59% between 2005 and 2008.
It signiﬁcantly began to grow in the ﬁrst half-year of 2009 and turned back
to the pre-crisis level in the second half-year of 2010.
The temporal variations of the magnitude of social inﬂuence provide empir-
ical evidence in favour of my second hypothesis. During the period until
the beginning of the economic crisis in 2008 as well as in 2010, social inﬂu-
ence among fund managers was considerably lower than during the crisis.
This suggests that fund managers try to diﬀerentiate from their competitors
during an economic upturn in order to get a superior remuneration. Dur-
ing an economic turndown, however, they fear the loss of reputation and
consequently of remuneration, such that they are more prone to align their
26Figure 1:
Table 8: Dynamics of the DAX30
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(a) Average magnitude of inﬂuence and overall network density. (b) Magnitude of inﬂu-
ence, that is due to fund managers working in the same city and network density of those
fund managers. (c) Price level of the DAX30 and volatility of daily DAX30 returns
27portfolio decisions with other fund managers. This theory is also supported
by the evolution of the network density. At the beginning of the crisis, fund
managers were only inﬂuenced by those fund managers, they had also been
(but less strongly) inﬂuenced before. During the crisis, the number of fund
managers by whom a particular fund manager is inﬂuenced increased notably.
This lead to a market wide alignment of portfolio weights, which could be
based on afore cited eﬀects of reputation and remuneration.
Now, turning to the third hypothesis, I intend to shed light on the tem-
poral ﬂuctuation of the inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion, deﬁned as
social inﬂuence among fund managers that work in the same city. It can
be stated that the magnitude of inﬂuence as well as the network density is
more or less constant in time. This means, that the increase of inﬂuence and
the enlargement of the inﬂuential network during the crisis are not due to
an increase of inﬂuence from the exchange of opinion. This is inline with
the argumentation, that interaction with social contacts does not vary with
the prevailing market environment, such that variations are due to ﬂuctua-
tions of observational inﬂuence most probably for motives of reputation and
remuneration.
5. Robustness checks
In order to rule out the possibility, that the results presented in the pre-
vious chapter are driven by factors that are not related to the presented ex-
planations, I provide some robustness checks. A key factor that potentially
could lead to biased results is that the underlying social network is deter-
mined endogenously. Thereby, only the inﬂuence from those fund managers
with correlated portfolio weights is considered. Moreover, this inﬂuence is a
priori weighted with the corresponding coeﬃcients from the pair-wise regres-
sions. As a ﬁrst robustness check, I repeated the empirical analysis with an
exogenous network. Therefore, I assumed that a fund manager can be inﬂu-
enced by any other fund managers with whom he holds at least 30 stocks in
common. I kept the restriction regarding the minimum number of common
stocks, because fund managers can only (intentionally) align their portfolios
if they have a minimum intersection of stocks. In order to illustrate this fact,
consider two fund managers that only share one common stock. The weight
of this stock depends on the weights of all other stocks in the respective
portfolios, such that a correlation of these single stock’s weights could only
be spurious. In order to overcome the potential bias that could result by
28Table 9:
Table 9: Robustness checks: Temporal mean values of the
magnitude of social inﬂuence δt for diﬀerent speciﬁcations
whole period bear market bull market diﬀerence
(I) min. 30 com. st. (standard) 0.6859 0.7376 0.6687 0.0689
(II) min. 30 com. st., exog. netw. 0.9346 0.9743 0.9214 0.0529
(III) min. 15 com. st., endog. netw. 0.7867 0.8423 0.7681 0.0742
(IV) min. 100 com. st., endog. netw. 0.5157 0.5446 0.5060 0.0385
Speciﬁcation I represents the standard model used for the empirical analysis of this paper.
Speciﬁcation II is based on an exogenous network as explained in the text. Speciﬁcations
III and IV are used to vary the minimum number of stocks two fund managers have to
hold in common, such that they could potentially inﬂuence each other. The correspond-
ing minimum numbers are 15 and 100. In the ﬁrst column, the overall temporal mean
values of regression coeﬃcients measuring the magnitude of social inﬂuence are displayed.
The second and the third columns show the corresponding temporal mean values for the
bearish market environment (2008/II, 2009/I, 2009/II) and the bullish market environ-
ment (remaining period of analysis). In the last column, the diﬀerences of average social
inﬂuence between the two diﬀerent market environments are presented.
weighting the inﬂuence of fund managers diﬀerently, I chose equal weights
for every fund manager. The results can be seen in table 9 (speciﬁcation II).
The overall average coeﬃcient of social inﬂuence equals 0.9346. This is by
far higher than the magnitude of social inﬂuence obtained by the standard
model in the previous chapter and indicates that my results are not upward
biased through the usage of an endogenous network. Having a closer look
to the dynamics of social inﬂuence, I compared the mean value of the coeﬃ-
cients obtained for the second half-year of 2008 and both half-years of 2009
(bearish market environment) with the temporal average of the coeﬃcients
obtained for the remaining period of analysis (bullish market environment).
The diﬀerence equals 0.0529 and is only slighter lower than the diﬀerence
found by applying the standard model amounting to 0.0689 (see speciﬁca-
tion I in table 9). Hence, even if one does not trust the absolute values of
social inﬂuence, temporal variations attest a relative diﬀerence between the
periods of bull and bear markets.
In order to provide further robustness checks, I varied the minimum number
of stocks that two fund managers have to hold in common, such that they
could potentially inﬂuence each other. First, I reduced this number to 15.
29Thereafter, I augmented it to 100. The results are also shown in table 9
(speciﬁcations III and IV). The diﬀerence of social inﬂuence between the two
market environments equals 0.0742, if 15 common stocks are requested and
amounts to 0.0385, if the threshold is set to 100. Hence, speciﬁcation III
leads to a higher diﬀerence social inﬂuence compared the standard model,
while speciﬁcation IV yields a lower diﬀerence. This is inline with the ex-
planations provided in the proceeding chapter. The number of minimum
common stocks controls the number of fund managers by whom a particu-
lar fund manager is assumed to be potentially inﬂuenced. The more fund
managers are considered to inﬂuence a particular fund manager, the higher
is the measured magnitude of inﬂuence in case of a market wide portfolio
alignment. Hence, the diﬀerence of social inﬂuence between the two states
of the economy which resulted to be higher for a smaller threshold can be
interpreted as evidence in favour of a market wide portfolio alignment during
an economic downturn.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I analysed the social inﬂuence on portfolio decisions that
fund managers investing in DAX30 companies have on each other. I ﬁrst de-
termined the underlying inﬂuential network by examining every possible link
between two fund managers. The constructed network resulted to be very
sparse. Using a two step estimation procedure, I then estimated the mag-
nitude of inﬂuence. In the average, a fund manager increases the portfolio
weight of a particular stock by 0.69%, if the fund managers in his reference
group increase the corresponding weight by 1%. Looking at intra-city inﬂu-
ence, I concluded that 8.62% of the total inﬂuence is based on the exchange
of opinion.
Relating the inﬂuence among fund managers to the dynamics of the DAX30, I
concluded that fund managers adapt their behaviour to the prevailing market
situation. In times of a bull market, fund managers rather try to diﬀerenti-
ate themselves from their competitors. During a bear market, they are more
prone to align their portfolio weights with the others. These behavioural
patterns are most probably due to reputational reasons and eﬀects of remu-
neration. This is inline with the fact, that the inﬂuence from the exchange
of opinion, deﬁned as intra-city inﬂuence, does not alter with the prevailing
market environment.
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34Appendix A.
In this appendix, it shall be shown, that the instruments Z = [ΓtXt,Xt]
can be used to estimate equation 3 by a 2SLS estimator, if Xt is uncorrelated
with the error term and if the spectral radius of δtΓt is smaller than one.
The endogenous regressor Γtwt can be expressed by the reduced form equa-
tion 4 in the following way
Γtwt = Γt (I − δtΓt)
−1 (Xtβt + t). (A.1)
If the spectral radius of δtΓt is lower than one, the Neumann expansion can
be used and leads to
Γtwt = Γt
 
I + δtΓt + δ
2
tΓt
2 + ...

(Xtβt + t). (A.2)
If Xt is not correlated with t, it thereof follows that ΓtXt is a valid instru-
ment for Γtwt, because it is correlated with Γtwt, but does not have a direct
impact on wt, as it does not appear in equation 3.
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